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Abstract
The paper provides a tractable, analytical framework to study regulatory risk un-
der optimal incentive regulation. Regulatory risk is captured by uncertainty about the
policy variables in the regulator’s objective function: weights attached to profits and
costs of public funds. Results are as follows: 1) The regulator’s reaction to regulatory
risk depends on the curvature of the aggregate demand function. 2) It yields a pos-
itive information rent effect exactly when demand is convex. 3) Firms benefit from
regulatory risk exactly when demand is convex. 4) Consumers’ risk preferences tend to
contradict the firm’s. 5) Benevolent regulators always prefer regulatory risk and these
preferences may contradict both the firm’s and consumers’ preferences.
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1 Introduction
Regulatory risk reflects the uncertainty behind new or changing regulation over time. As
illustrated in Table I, recent surveys reveal that firms view regulatory risk as one the greatest
threats to their business.1 Emphasizing the importance of regulatory risk, the Ernst&Young
2008 survey on strategic business risk proclaimed regulatory and compliance risk as “the
greatest strategic challenge facing leading global businesses in 2008”. In popular debate,
regulatory risk is seen as an important impediment to a firm’s long term investment and,
therefore, to hinder economic growth. Regulators acknowledge that regulatory risk may
impede effective regulation but downplay its influence on their actual policies.2
Despite its judged importance by practitioners, regulatory risk has received little atten-
tion in economic theory. In particular, its economic effects have not been studied in modern
theories of optimal regulation. Without such studies, our understanding of the problem
remains limited. This paper contributes to filling this gap between practise and theory
by providing a tractable, analytical framework to study regulatory risk. The framework is
based on the seminal regulation models of Baron and Myerson (1982) and Laffont and Tirole
(1986). These models include two natural regulatory variables: the relative weight of the
firm’s profits in the regulator’s objective function and the cost of public funds.3,4 I show that
introducing uncertainty concerning these regulatory variables yields a formal model of reg-
ulatory risk and enables an evaluation of the attitudes of different economic agents towards
regulatory risk.
1Surveys freely available at http://graphics.eiu.com and http://www.ey.com. See also DLA Piper ”Eu-
ropean Regulatory Risk Awareness Survey 2007” accessible at http://www.dlapiper.com.
2E.g., ”What Regulatory Risk” by Paul Plummer, ORR Chief Economist: http://www.rail-
reg.gov.uk/upload/pdf/utiljrnl.pdf (11-15-2008)
3Baron and Myerson (1982) introduced the regulation models that are based on the relative weight of the
firm’s profits in the regulator’s objective function. Laffont and Tirole (1986) developed regulation models
that are based on a strictly positive cost of public funds. I follow the approach of Armstrong and Sappington
(2008, p.1563) who offer an integration of these two models.
4Clearly, regulatory risk may also be modeled differently. The paper’s conclusion discusses and points to
such alternative modeling strategies.
2
Table I
Top 5 risks to business according to EUI and Ernst&Young reports on business risks.
Rank EUI 2005 E&J 2008 E&J 2009
1 Regulatory risk Regulatory and compliance Risk Credit crunch
2 IT network risk Global and financial shocks Regulatory and compliance
3 Human capital risk Aging consumers and workforce Deepening recession
4 Reputational risk Emerging markets Radical greening
5 Market risk Industry consolidation Non–traditional entrants
The framework reveals that, contrary to the popular view, regulatory risk may actually
benefit firms. This occurs exactly when aggregate consumer demand is convex. The cur-
vature of the demand function plays a crucial role, because it determines the direction of
an information rent effect of regulatory risk. In particular, I show that, in canonical mod-
els of optimal incentive regulation, the regulator reacts to an increase in regulatory risk by
increasing output when demand is convex. This reaction implies higher information rents
and benefits the firm. In contrast, the consumer, who is ultimately paying for these rents,
is hurt by a positive information rent effect. For concave demand, the results are reversed.
The regulator reacts to regulatory risk by reducing output and, therefore, the information
rent effect is negative. This hurts the firm, but benefits consumers.
I show that the information rent effect uniquely determines the firm’ risk attitude to-
wards regulatory risk. Hence, with convex demand the firm likes regulatory risk and, for
concave demand, the firm dislikes it. In contrast, the consumer’s attitude towards regula-
tory risk is more complex. Due to decreasing marginal utility, the consumer has a natural
aversion towards fluctuations in output. Hence, in addition to the information rent effect,
the consumer’s attitude towards regulatory risk also depends on how it affects output fluctu-
ations. Notwithstanding this additional effect, the analysis reveals that with convex demand
consumers are hurt by uncertainty about the weight which the regulator attaches to profits,
while consumers like risk about the cost of public funds when demand is concave. The con-
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sumers’ overall attitude towards regulatory risk depends, therefore, on the policy dimension
in which the regulatory risk dominates. In general, the consumers’ risk attitudes can be
aligned or misaligned with those of the firm.
I further obtain that the regulator himself always benefits from regulatory risk. The
intuition behind this result is similar to the classical observation of Waugh (1944), who
showed that consumers may benefit from fluctuating prices. With respect to the regulator,
this insight leads to the paradoxical result that the regulator’s risk preferences may contradict
both those of the firm and consumers, even though he is “benevolent” in the sense that his
objective function is a weighted sum of the consumers’ surplus and the firms profits. The
result obtains when there is uncertainty about the weight with which the regulator evaluates
profits, because the uncertainty about this weight destroys the natural alignment between
the preferences of the regulator and those of the consumers and firm. The result implies
that a benevolent regulator may not want to lower the degree of regulatory risk even if this
is in the interest of both consumers and the regulated firm. This has the policy implication
that additional incentives are needed, such as an explicit directive to minimize regulatory
risk, to induce the regulator to reduce regulatory risk.
How reasonable is it to model regulatory risk as uncertainty about the cost of public
funds and the regulator’s weight attached to profits? First of all, these policy variables have
no direct economic effect on firms or consumers and only matter in relation to the regulation
problem itself. Hence, from a theoretical perspective, uncertainty about these variables is the
purest form of regulatory risk one may consider. From a more practical view, the relevance of
the model depends, of course, on whether these variables are actually uncertain in practise.
Auriol and Warlters (2006) show empirically that the marginal cost of public funds fluctuates
much between countries. They confirm the intuition that it depends on a country’s taxation
system and, in particular, tax rates. In most, if not all, advanced economies tax rates
change considerably and rather unpredictability in the period of just a few decades. Hence,
in particular for long term investments such as power plants and infrastructure, uncertainties
about the future cost of public funds are considerable. Similarly, one may argue that also
the regulator’s weight on profits is uncertain. Regulation is often influenced by political
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considerations and political parties may have differing views about the correct weight of
company profits in the regulator’s objective function. Indeed, one of the main differences
between political parties in modern economies is their degree of business friendliness and their
attitudes towards profits. Hence, if we acknowledge that election outcomes are uncertain,
then this policy variable is uncertain for regulatory projects that outlast the typical electorial
cycle.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the related liter-
ature. Section 3 introduces a regulation model based on Armstrong and Sappington (2008)
that comprises the two seminal regulation models of Baron and Myerson (1982) and Laffont
and Tirole (1986). Section 4 computes the optimal regulation schedule for deterministic
policy variables and studies its comparative statics with respect to the policy variables. In
Section 5 I then investigate the attitudes towards regulatory risk by the different economic
agents: the firm, the regulator, and consumers. The paper closes with a conclusion where I
discuss the different policy implications of my results. Formal proofs of the propositions are
collected in the appendix.
2 Related Literature
Although the literature on regulation is vast, the strand of the literature that explicitly ad-
dresses the riskiness of regulation is small. Chang and Thompson (1989) analyze regulatory
risk for the case of rate of return regulation. They illustrate with numerical examples that
firms may benefit or lose from random errors in setting the allowed rate of return. Panteghini
and Scarpa (2003) study the effect of regulatory risk on investment by comparing price–caps
to profit–sharing rules. Both these papers compare ad–hoc regulation schemes rather than
studying regulatory risk in an optimal regulation framework.
Regulatory risk is related to the literature on “regulatory opportunism”, e.g., Laffont
and Tirole (1988, 1990), Lyon (1991), Salant and Woroch (1992), Gilbert and Newbery
(1994), Lyon and Li (2003), and Lyon and Mayo (2005). This literature studies regulators
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that, due to incomplete regulatory contracts, behave opportunistically. Regulatory risk and
regulatory opportunism are, however, two distinct concepts. Regulatory risk involves, nec-
essarily, uncertainty about regulatory changes, whereas regulatory opportunism does not.
For instance, in Laffont and Tirole (1988; 1990) or Salant and Woroch (1992) the regula-
tor behaves opportunistically, but the firm fully anticipates the implied future changes in
regulation. Consequently, there is opportunism but no risk. The problem of regulatory
opportunism may, however, lead to regulatory risk. In particular, it arises when firms are
uncertain about the degree of opportunistic behavior by regulators as analyzed in Lyon and
Li (2003). Regulatory risk may also arise due to other sources of uncertainty. For instance,
Lyon (1991) and Gilbert and Newbery (1994) examine how rate of return regulation affects
the firm’s behavior when investments are risky. The risky investment leads to regulatory
risk, because the regulatory outcome depends on the risky outcome of the project. Lyon
and Mayo (2005) present an empirical appraisal of whether regulators in practise behave
opportunistically.
The issue of regulatory risk has also been raised, albeit somewhat more informally, in
the discussion of “stranded–costs”. In particular, Baumol, Joskow, and Kahn (1994) and
Baumol and Sidak (1995) discuss how, following an unexpected deregulation in US electricity
markets, monopolistic utilities were unable to recoup their long term investments due to
intensified competition. This discussion, however, takes a more ex post perspective. It
mainly addresses the question whether regulated firms should be compensated after their
market has been opened to competition. Nevertheless, some of the arguments do take a
more ex ante perspective. In particular, Baumol and Sidak (1995) claim that a failure to
compensate firms for their stranded–costs discourages future investment. Kolbe, Tye, and
Myers (1993), Kolbe and Tye (1995, 1996), Pedell (2006) discuss whether and how stranded–
costs affect the cost of capital.
An older literature, e.g., Oi (1961), Hartmann (1972), Abel (1983), Pindyck (1988),
studies the role of price and cost uncertainty on firms. Although the fundamental question
in my work is similar – how does risk affect firms? – one cannot extrapolate these results to a
regulation framework. An important difference is that these papers study mainly competitive
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markets, whereas, by its nature, the regulation framework applies more to monopolistic
settings.5 Also the underlying non–market mechanism behind the regulatory framework and
the associated policy questions are different.
3 The Setup
Consider a monopolistic firm that can supply a public good in a quantity x at a constant
average costs c ∈ [cl, ch].
6 The exact marginal costs are private information of the firm.
To all outsiders, the cost c is distributed according to the probability density function f(c)
with support C = [cl, ch] and its associated cumulative density F (c). I assume that the
density function satisfies the monotone hazard rate property: the ratio h(c) ≡ F (c)/f(c)
is non–decreasing in c. This assumption circumvents technical problems of bunching and
guarantees that deterministic mechanisms are optimal.7
The regulated firm is risk neutral. This assumption is not only standard, but also elim-
inates any confusion that the firm’s attitude towards regulatory risk is due to exogenously
imposed risk preferences. In particular, the firm’s profit from producing a quantity x for a
lump–sum transfer t is
Π(t, x|c) = t− cx.
I follow the framework popularized in Laffont and Tirole (1986 and 1993) that the gov-
ernment buys the public good with public funds and makes it available to consumers. Public
funds are raised by taxation. In particular, if the government has to raise taxes t to obtain
a quantity x of the public good, the consumer surplus is
Ψ(t, x) = v(x)− (1 + µ)t.
5E.g., Samuelson (1972) argues that, in competitive markets, the positive partial equilibrium effects of
fluctuating prices in Waugh (1944) and Oi (1961) are infeasible in general equilibrium.
6As discussed in Section 6 results do not crucially depend on the assumption of constant return to scale
technologies.
7See Strausz (2006) for the latter claim.
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The variable µ ≥ 0 captures the social cost of public funds due to distortionary taxation.
The term v(x) expresses the consumers’ overall utility from the consumption of a quantity
x of the public good. I assume that the consumer’s marginal utility of the public good x is
positive but decreasing, i.e., v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0. I also assume that v′′′ exists. Because v′
represents the consumers’ (inverse) aggregate demand function, the third derivative v′′′ has
a natural interpretation: it determines the curvature of the consumers’ aggregate demand
function. For v′′′ > 0, aggregate demand is convex. For v′′′ < 0, it is concave.
Due to its monopolistic position, the government regulates the firm’s production. Having
the general public’s interest at heart, the government institutionalizes a regulator with an
objective function that consists of a weighted sum of consumer surplus and profits:
W (x, t, c|λ, µ) = Ψ(x, t) + λΠ(x, t|c) (1)
= v(x)− λcx− (1 + µ− λ)t.
The regulator is given the task to maximize the objective function, W , under the presence
of asymmetric information about the marginal cost c and the firm’s outside option of zero.
The parameters λ and µ are the two main policy variables that influence regulation.
Hence, my regulation model follows the unifying approach of Armstrong and Sappington
(2008, p.1563). It comprises the two classical sources of inefficiencies in regulation models as
originally introduced by Baron and Myerson (1982) and Laffont and Tirole (1986). In Baron
and Myerson (1982) the regulator attaches a weight of zero to the firm’s profits and there
is no distortionary taxation, i.e., λ = µ = 0. In the regulation framework of Laffont and
Tirole (1986), distortions occur because the transfer is financed by taxation which leads to
a deadweight loss, i.e., λ = 1 and µ > 0. As motivated in the introduction, the paper’s main
conceptual new idea is to model regulatory risk as uncertainty about the policy variables λ
and µ.
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4 Optimal Deterministic Regulation
Let us first compute the regulator’s optimal regulation contract for a deterministic policy
pair (λ, µ). Appealing to the revelation principle, the regulator’s optimal contract is a direct
mechanism, (t, x), that gives the firm an incentive to report its true cost type c. Formally,
a direct mechanism is a pair of functions t : [cl, ch] → R and x : [cl, ch] → R+, where t(c)
represents the transfer to the firm and x(c) the required quantity to be produced when the
firm reports a cost c.
Let
Πr(cr, c) ≡ t(cr)− cx(cr).
represent the firm’s profit associated with a regulation contract (t, x) if it reports a cost cr
when its actual costs are c. It then follows that the regulator’s optimal contract is a solution
to the following maximization problem.
P : max
x(.),t(.)
∫ ch
cl
W (x(c), t(c), c|λ, µ)f(c)dc (2)
s.t. Πr(c, c) ≥ Πr(cr, c) ∀c, cr ∈ [cl, ch] (3)
Πr(c, c) ≥ 0, ∀c ∈ [cl, ch], (4)
where (3) represents the incentive compatibility conditions that ensure truthtelling and (4)
represents the firm’s participation constraints.
Solving the regulator’s problem is standard. Incentive compatibility implies that x(c)
is weakly decreasing in c. As a consequence, any incentive compatible schedule x(c) is
differentiable almost everywhere. Hence, an incentive compatible direct mechanism satisfies
the first order condition for truthtelling,
∂Πr
∂cr
∣∣∣∣∣
cr=c
= 0⇒ t′(c) = cx′(c). (5)
If we let Π˜(c) ≡ Πr(c, c) denote the firm’s profit when it reports its cost truthfully, then, by
the envelope theorem, incentive compatibility implies
Π˜′(c) = −x(c).
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Consequently, the firm’s profit is
Π˜(c) = Π˜(ch)−
∫ ch
c
Π˜′(c˜)dc˜ =
∫ ch
c
x(c˜)dc˜+ Π˜(ch). (6)
Because t(c) = Π˜(c) + cx(c), we may, after substitution and an integration by parts,
rewrite the regulator’s objective function (2) as8
W˜ (x(c), c|λ, µ) ≡
∫ ch
cl
w˜(x(c), c|λ, µ)f(c)dc, (7)
with
w˜(x, c|λ, µ) ≡ v(x)− (1 + µ)cx− (1 + µ− λ)xh(c). (8)
Consequently, the optimal quantity schedule x(.) solves the problem
P˜ : max
x(.)
W˜ (x(c), c|λ, µ)
s.t. x(c) is monotone decreasing. (9)
Due to the concavity of v(x) and the non–decreasing hazard rate h(c), the monotonicity
constraint is not binding. A solution to P˜ obtains, therefore, from a point–wise maximization
with respect to x(c). The first order condition for an optimal schedule x∗(c) yields9
v′(x∗(c)) = (1 + µ)c+ (1 + µ− λ)h(c). (10)
The optimality condition (10) has the usual interpretation. In the optimum, the regulator
equates the consumer’s marginal utility to the regulator’s virtual cost, c¯ ≡ (1 + µ)c + (1 +
µ− λ)h(c).
An important benchmark obtains when the cost of public funds is zero (µ = 0) and the
regulator values the firm’s profits in full (λ = 1). In this case, there are no distortions. Let
8For the formal exposition
9Due to the concavity of v, first order conditions are sufficient. Sufficient conditions on v such that (10)
has a solution are limx→0 v
′(x) =∞ and limx→∞ v
′(x) = 0.
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xfb(c) denote the optimal undistorted quantity schedule. That is, xfb(c) satisfies the first
order condition
v′(xfb(c)) = c. (11)
In the first best, marginal benefits equal the actual marginal costs, c, rather than the virtual
costs, c¯. If we define
x¯ ≡ xfb(cl),
we can interpret x¯ as the maximum relevant output level, because the concavity of v implies
that, for any possible combination (λ, µ), we have x∗(c) ≤ xfb(c) ≤ x¯.
The first order condition (10) will play a crucial role in the subsequent analysis. In
order to express explicitly the dependence of the optimal regulatory scheme on the policy
variables λ and µ, let (x∗(λ, µ|c), t∗(λ, µ|c)) represent the regulation schedule by a regulator
who attaches weight λ to profits and cost µ to the deadweight loss of taxation. The scheme
x∗(λ, µ|c) is implicitly defined by (10). Using the first order condition for optimal reporting
(5) and that, optimally, Π˜(ch) = 0, the optimal payment schedule t
∗(λ, µ|c) is
t∗(λ, µ|c) = chx
∗(λ, µ|ch)−
∫ ch
c
c
∂x∗(λ, µ|c)
∂c
dc. (12)
In the remainder of this section, I derive the properties of the regulatory schedule
x∗(λ, µ|c) that will be helpful to identify the effect of regulatory risk on the different economic
agents.
We may first confirm the straightforward intuition that the schedule x∗(λ, µ|c) is increas-
ing in λ and decreasing in µ. Indeed, using the implicit function theorem a differentiation
of (10) with respect to λ and µ yields
v′′(x∗(c))
∂x∗
∂λ
= −h(c) and v′′(x∗(c))
∂x∗
∂µ
= c+ h(c). (13)
From these two equations, it follows ∂x∗/∂λ > 0 and ∂x∗/∂µ < 0.
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Next, we address the curvature of x∗(λ, µ|c). Differentiating the expressions in (13) with
respect to λ and µ, it follows, after a rearrangement of terms,
∂2x∗
∂λ2
= −
v′′′(x∗(c))
v′′(x∗(c))
(
∂x∗
∂λ
)2
(14)
∂2x∗
∂µ2
= −
v′′′(x∗(c))
v′′(x∗(c))
(
∂x∗
∂µ
)2
(15)
∂2x∗
∂λ∂µ
= −
v′′′(x∗(c))
v′′(x∗(c))
∂x∗
∂λ
∂x∗
∂µ
. (16)
Hence, the Hessian of x∗(λ, µ|c) is
Dx∗(λ, µ) ≡

 ∂
2x∗
∂λ2
∂2x∗
∂λ∂µ
∂2x∗
∂λ∂µ
∂2x∗
∂µ2

 = −v′′′(x∗(c))
v′′(x∗(c))


(
∂x∗
∂λ
)2
∂x∗
∂λ
∂x∗
∂µ
∂x∗
∂λ
∂x∗
∂µ
(
∂x∗
∂µ
)2

 .
Due to the specific symmetry, the determinant of the Hessian matrix is zero so that x∗(c) is
convex in (λ, µ) for v′′′ > 0. Likewise, x∗(c) is concave for v′′′ < 0. The following proposition
collects these insights.
Proposition 1 The optimal regulation schedule x∗(c) is characterized by the first order con-
dition (10). The optimal quantity x∗(λ, µ|c) is increasing in λ and decreasing in µ. It is
convex in (λ, µ) if aggregate demand is convex. It is concave in (λ, µ) if aggregate demand
is concave.
The intuition why the curvature of the regulatory schedule coincides with the curvature
of the demand function is illustrated in Figure 1.10 Because v′(x) reflects the consumers’
aggregate (inverse) demand function, identity (10) implies that the regulator equates demand
to his virtual marginal cost c¯ = (1 + µ)c + (1 + µ − λ)h(c). When the policy parameters
are random, the virtual costs c¯ are random. Figure 1 illustrates for a two point distribution
that, for convex demand, the expected demand, xe = Eλ,µ{x(c¯)}, exceeds the demand of the
10Note that the effect of regulatory risk depends exactly on the term −v′′′(x∗(c))/v′′(x∗(c)). Interestingly,
this ratio is the well–known prudence measure in the literature on precautionary savings (e.g., Leland 1968
and Kimball 1990), where exactly this measure determines whether the consumer increases or decreases its
savings in response to additional risk. Here it plays a similar role of determining whether more risk induces
the regulator to in– or decrease the output x.
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xp
b
c¯1 b
x1
c¯e b
x(¯ce)<xe
c¯2 b
x2
x
p
x1
b
xe<x(¯ce)
c¯e b
c¯1 b
c¯2 b
x2
Figure 1: Convex (v′′′ > 0) and concave (v′′′ < 0) demand.
expected virtual costs, x(c¯e) = x∗(Eλ,µ{c¯}). For concave demand, we obtain the opposite
result.
5 Attitudes Towards Regulatory Risk
In this section, I study the attitudes towards regulatory risk. The central idea is the following.
Suppose that the policy parameters (λ, µ) are distributed according to some non–degenerate
distribution g(λ, µ) with expectations (λe, µe) ≡ Eg(λ, µ). I say that an economic agent likes
regulatory risk whenever his expected payoffs under any non–degenerate distribution g(λ, µ)
are larger than the payoffs that obtain when the policy parameters are deterministic and
correspond to the expectations (λe, µe).
11 Whenever, for any non–degenerate distribution,
expected profits are lower than the profits under the deterministic parameters (λe, µe), the
economic agent dislikes regulatory risk. I study the risk attitude for each of the three types
of economic agents: the firm, the regulator, and the consumers.
The attitude towards regulatory risk depends on the curvature of the payoff function with
11Hence, the distribution g(λ, µ) is a mean preserving spread of the degenerate distribution (λe, µe) in the
sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970).
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respect to the policy variables. Therefore, an economic agent likes regulatory risk exactly
when his payoff is convex in the policy parameters (λ, µ). In contrast, he dislikes regulatory
risk when his payoff is concave.
I first address the firm’s risk attitude. From (6) and Π˜(ch) = 0, it follows that the profit
of a firm with cost c coincides with its information rent:
Π˜(c) =
∫ ch
c
x∗(c˜)dc˜.
Hence, the curvature of x∗(λ, µ|c) determines the curvature of Π˜(c). This observation yields
the following result.
Proposition 2 The firm likes regulatory risk when demand is convex. For concave demand,
the firm dislikes regulatory risk.
The proposition shows that the curvature of the consumers’ aggregate demand function
fully determines the firm’s attitude towards regulatory risk. We may explain this observation
on the basis of an information rent effect of regulatory risk. Figure 1 shows that, for convex
demand, the regulator responds to regulatory risk by raising output in expected terms.
Expression (6) shows that, due to the need for incentive compatibility, a raise in output
requires larger information rents. Hence, under convex demand regulatory risk has a positive
information rent effect, which benefits the firm. In contrast, the regulator responds to
regulatory risk with a reduction in output when demand is concave. For concave demand,
the information rent effect is, therefore, negative and this hurts the firm.
Next, consider the risk attitude of the regulator. Due to (7), a sufficient condition for the
convexity of the regulator’s payoff function in (λ, µ) is that w˜(x, c|λ, µ) is convex in (λ, µ)
for all c.
Because x∗(λ, µ|c) maximizes w˜(x, c|λ, µ) with respect to x, the envelope theorem yields
dw˜
dλ
= h(c)x∗(λ, µ|c) and
dw˜
dµ
= −(c+ h(c))x∗(λ, µ|c).
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Further differentiation yields the Hessian of w˜ with respect to (λ, µ),
Dw˜(λ, µ) ≡

 ∂
2w˜
∂λ2
∂2w˜
∂λ∂µ
∂2w˜
∂λ∂µ
∂2w˜
∂µ2

 =

 h(c)
∂x∗(c)
∂λ
−(c+ h(c))∂x
∗(c)
∂λ
h(c)∂x
∗(c)
∂µ
−(c+ h(c))∂x
∗(c)
∂µ

 .
The Hessian’s determinant is zero and, due to ∂x∗/∂λ > 0 and ∂x∗/∂µ < 0, it follows that
the Hessian is positive semi–definite. As a result, w˜ is convex in (λ, µ) and, therefore, also
W˜ is convex in (λ, µ). This yields the following result.
Proposition 3 Independent of demand conditions, the regulator likes regulatory risk.
The intuition behind the proposition is similar to Waugh (1944)’s classical observation
that consumers may benefit from fluctuating prices. The connection becomes clear when
considering Waugh’s argument for the case of a quasi–linear economy in which the consumer
has to choose between a consumption good x and a numeraire y and has the quasi–linear
utility u(x, y) = v(x) + y. In this case, the Marshallian consumer surplus is an appropriate
measure of the consumer’s welfare and, from decreasing marginal utility (v′′(x) < 0), it
follows that the Marshallian consumer surplus is convex in the price p of the consumption
good x. Note the similarity between Waugh’s consumer and the regulator in my model:
Waugh’s consumer maximizes v(x)−px and the quantity x satisfies the first order condition
v′(x) = p. Similarly, equation (8) reveals that the regulator maximizes v(x) − c¯x and
the quantity x satisfies the first order condition (10). The regulator’s virtual cost c¯ plays,
therefore, a role similar to the price p in the consumer’s problem. As a consequence, the
reason why fluctuations in (λ, µ) benefit the regulator is identical to the reason behind
Waugh (1944)’s observation that consumers in standard consumer theory may benefit from
fluctuating prices.
Finally, consider the consumer’s attitude towards regulatory risk. Here matters are some-
what less straightforward, because, due to decreasing marginal utility (v′′ < 0), the consumer
has already a natural tendency to dislike variations in output. To see how this affects the
consumer’s overall attitude towards regulatory risk, I first rewrite the consumers’ expected
utility from the regulator scheme x∗ as
Ψ =
∫ ch
cl
Ψ(t∗(c), x∗(c))f(c)dc =
∫ ch
cl
ψ(x∗(c), c|λ, µ)f(c)dc, (17)
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where
ψ(x, c|λ, µ) ≡ v(x)− (1 + µ)(c+ h(c))x. (18)
The expression ψ represents the virtual surplus of x from the consumers’ point of view.
They have to incur the transfer t to the firm which consists of the firm’s costs c and an
information rent that equals the hazard rate h(c). For µ > 0, the virtual marginal cost
c+ h(c) is augmented by the distortionary tax µ.
Whenever the consumer’s virtual surplus ψ is concave in (λ, µ), the consumer’s surplus
Ψ is concave in (λ, µ) and consumers dislike regulatory risk. The curvature of the virtual
surplus function ψ therefore plays a crucial role.
From (18) it follows
∂2ψ
∂λ2
=
[
v′′′(x∗(c))
v′′(x∗(c))
λh(c) + v′′(x∗(c))
](
∂x∗(c)
∂λ
)2
; (19)
∂2ψ
∂µ2
=
[
v′′′(x∗(c))
v′′(x∗(c))
λh(c)− v′′(x∗(c))
](
∂x∗(c)
∂µ
)2
; (20)
and
∂2ψ
∂λ∂µ
= λh(c)
v′′′(x∗(c))
v′′(x∗(c))
∂x∗(c)
∂λ
∂x∗(c)
∂µ
. (21)
From these second order derivatives follows the Hessian of ψ with determinant
−
(
v′′(x∗(c))
∂x∗(c)
∂λ
∂x∗(c)
∂µ
)2
.
The determinant is negative for any specification of v and, therefore, the function ψ is neither
convex nor concave in (λ, µ). This shows that, at this level of generality, where one considers
uncertainty in both policy variables at the same time, little can be said about the overall
risk attitude of consumers.
More insights can be gained, however, when considering uncertainty in each dimension
separately. First, consider uncertainty in the policy variable µ, which measures the cost
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of public funds. Equation (20) reveals that ψ is convex in µ for v′′′ < 0. Hence, with
concave demand consumers like risk with respect to µ. For convex demand, the sign of (20)
is indeterminate. To better understand this indeterminancy, observe that the consumers’
utility is closely linked to the regulator’s utility function:
ψ(x, c|λ, µ) = w˜(x, c|λ, µ)− λxh(c). (22)
Hence, the regulator’s and the consumers’ objective function differ exactly by the term λxh(c)
which reflects the regulator’s valuation of the firm’s profit. Proposition 3 demonstrates that
w˜ is convex in both λ and µ. When demand is concave, the output schedule x is concave
in µ and, therefore, the expression λxh(c) is also concave in µ. Subtracting a concave
function from a convex function, reinforces the convexity of the latter function. Hence, with
concave demand the convexity of w˜ implies that also ψ must be convex so that consumers
like regulatory risk. In contrast, the expression λxh(c) counteracts the convexity of w˜ when
demand is convex. It then depends on the relative strength of the two terms whether ψ
is convex or concave. This explains why the curvature of ψ is indeterminate with convex
demand.
Second, consider the consumer’s attitude towards uncertainty in the policy variable λ,
which measures the weight which the regulator attaches to the firm’s profits. Equation (19)
reveals that ψ is concave in λ for v′′′ > 0. For v′′′ < 0, the function ψ may either be convex
or concave in λ. We can explain this result by reconsidering the curvature of the expression
λxh(c) in (22) but now with respect to λ. Taking account that the expression depends on λ
directly and indirectly via x, the second order derivative with respect to λ reveals that the
curvature depends on the sign of
2v′′(x)− v′′′(x)
v′′(x)
∂x
∂λ
h(c).
For convex demand (v′′′ > 0), the sign is negative and, therefore, the term, λxh(c), is
concave. Subtracting it from w˜ then reinforces its convexity and, as a consequence, ψ is
convex itself. We, therefore, obtain that consumers like risk in λ. In contrast, the expression
may be convex when demand is concave so that it counteracts the convexity of w˜. In this
case, the curvature of ψ with respect to λ is ambiguous.
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Table II
Attitudes towards regulatory risk
Risk in λ Risk in µ
Firm Regulator Consumer Firm Regulator Consumer
convex demand + + – + + –/+
concave demand – + –/+ – + +
The following proposition collect these observations.
Proposition 4 With convex demand, consumers dislike regulatory risk concerning λ. With
concave demand, consumers like regulatory risk concerning µ.
The proposition shows that consumers tend to dislike regulatory risk when demand is
convex and tend to like it for concave demand. Yet, in general, the curvature of the demand
function is insufficient to determine the consumer’s attitude towards regulatory risk. This
indeterminacy obtains because, due to the consumer’s decreasing marginal utility, the con-
sumer has a natural tendency to dislike fluctuations in the output x. Hence, the consumer’s
attitude towards regulatory risk depends on two factors: the information rent effect and the
way regulatory risk affect fluctuations in the overall output schedule x(c). The curvature of
the demand function determines only the first effect, whereas the second effect depends also
on v′′(x) which represents the slope of the demand function.
Table II summarizes the main findings of Proposition 2, 3, and 4. It illustrates the risk
attitudes of the three economic parties in the different policy dimensions. Because of a
contradictory evaluation of the information rent effect of regulatory risk, the risk attitudes
of the firm and consumers tend to be misaligned. Firms like risk when demand is convex,
but in this case consumer dislike risk concerning λ. Similarly, with concave demand, firms
dislike risk whereas consumer like risk with respect to µ. Yet, when the information rent
effect is too small to outweigh the consumers’ natural tendency to dislike variations in output
due to decreasing marginal utility, the firm’s and consumers’ risk preferences coincide. In
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particular, when demand is concave, both the firm and consumers may dislike regulatory
risk. Because the regulators always likes regulatory risk, we obtain, therefore, the following,
surprising result.
Proposition 5 A benevolent regulator’s preferences concerning regulatory risk with respect
to λ contradict the preferences of both the firm and consumers whenever for all x ∈ (0, x¯]
and c ∈ [cl, ch],
v′′′(x) < 0 and |v′′′(x)|h(c) < [v′′(x)]2. (23)
At first sight, this is a paradoxical result. How can a benevolent regulator, who has only
the interest of the firm and consumers in mind, have preferences that go against the interests
of both the firm and consumers? Indeed, the objective function of the regulator is a weighted
sum of the firm’s and the consumers’ payoffs. Hence, based on the mathematical fact, that a
weighted sum of two concave functions is itself concave, one is tempted to argue that if both
the firm and the consumers dislike regulatory risk, then also the regulator must dislike it.
Yet, this reasoning neglects that, under regulatory risk in λ, also the weight itself involves
risk. This yields an additional effect of risk on the regulator that is not present for the firm or
consumers. The proposition shows that condition (23) is sufficient for this additional effect
to dominate.12 Intuitively, the condition says that demand should be concave but not too
much. More specifically, it requires that |v′′′| is relatively small in comparison to |v′′|. We
can explain this insight by referring to the information rent effect of regulatory risk and the
consumers’ natural tendency to dislike risk due to decreasing marginal utility: The term |v′′′|
measures the strength of the information rent effect, whereas |v′′| measures the strength of
the consumers’ decreasing marginal utility. Hence, a relatively small |v′′′| in comparison to
12A simple, concrete example where the effect dominates is v(x) = −x3 + 2x2 + 2x, marginal cost c
uniformly distributed over [1, 2], and uncertainty about policy variable λ only. Because the effect dominates
already for rather straightforward specifications of the model, Proposition 5 does not seem to reflect only
pathological cases.
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|v′′| implies that the information rent effect is too small to counteract the natural tendency
of the consumer to dislike fluctuations in output due to the consumers’ decreasing marginal
utility. Hence, despite the information rent effect, consumers still dislike regulatory risk.
In addition, a negative v′′′ means that the firm also dislikes regulatory risk. Because the
regulator always likes regulatory risk, the preferences of the firm and consumers contradict
those of the regulator.
Table II reveals that, for risk in µ only, it is not possible that the risk attitudes of
both the firm and the consumers contradict the regulator’s attitude towards regulatory risk.
This is exactly because the regulator’s objective function is a weighted sum of the firm’s
and the consumer’s preferences. If the firm’s and consumers’ risk preferences concerning µ
are aligned then the regulator’s preferences also coincide with these preferences. Hence, a
misalignment of the regulator’s preferences can obtain only when the riskiness in λ is strong
enough relative to the riskiness in µ.
The opposing risk preferences have the important economic implication that it may in-
duce a benevolent regulator to act against the interest of both consumers and the regulated
firm. In particular, a regulator will not take (costly) measures to lower the degree of reg-
ulatory risk. Indeed, to induce the regulator to take such measures and act in the interest
of the firm and consumers, other explicit incentives are needed. An example would be an
explicit directive for the regulator to reduce regulatory risk. From Proposition 5, it follows
that it does not suffice to endow the regulator with a payoff function that is a weighted sum
of the parties he is to represent.
6 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper studies the effect of regulatory risk in an optimal regulatory framework on the
three different economic agents: firms, consumers, and regulators. The analysis yields the
following insights and policy implications.
First, when demand is convex, regulatory risk leads to larger expected profits. Taking
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expected future profits as a measure of the incentive to invest, the larger expected profits
suggest a stronger investment incentive for a regulated firm. This result contradicts the
common view that regulatory risk is detrimental to investment and economic growth and
should therefore be avoided. Conclusions are, however, reversed for concave demand. With
regard to investment incentives and economic growth, the analysis reveals that the curvature
of demand plays a crucial role for policy implications.
Second, the consumers’ risk attitudes tend to contradict the firm’s attitude towards
regulatory risk. In particular, when demand is convex, consumers dislike risk about the
relative weight at which the regulator values profits. When demand is concave, consumers
like risk about the cost of public funds. In some circumstances, however, the attitudes of the
firm and consumers coincide. In particular, for concave demand regulatory risk may hurt
both the firm and consumers. In this case, the policy implication is to minimize regulatory
risk.
Third, irrespective of the firm’s and the consumers’ risk attitudes, the regulator always
likes regulatory risk. Hence, with regard to regulatory risk, one cannot expect the regulator
to act in society’s interest even if his objective function is a weighted sum of the consumers’
and the firm’s surplus. This insight yields the policy implication that regulators may require
explicit incentives to minimize regulatory risk. In particular, when demand is concave and
regulatory risk hurts both the firm and consumers, the regulator should be given an explicit
directive to reduce regulatory risk. A public communication of the UK Office of Rail Reg-
ulation in 2000 provides some anecdotal evidence of a regulator’s relaxed attitude towards
regulatory risk.13 The letter, written by the Chief Economist after public concerns about
regulatory risk, acknowledges its potential threat to effective regulation but downplays its
actual significance.
Results show that the curvature of the demand function is a major determinant of the
economic effects of regulatory risk. Regrettably, the economic literature provides little infor-
13See ”What Regulatory Risk” by Paul Plummer, ORR Chief Economist, January 2000, accessible at
http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/upload/pdf/utiljrnl.pdf (last retrieved 11-15-2008).
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mation about the curvature of demand functions. First, consumer theory does not provide
any guidance about curvature. Indeed, in economic theory some applications use concave
demand, while others assume it to be convex.14 Hence, the question whether demand is
convex or concave is a purely empirically one and depends on the specific market under
consideration. Yet, even though the empirical literature on demand functions is vast, there
are few empirical results about the curvature of demand. One reason is that most empirical
studies are based on parametric demand estimations. These estimation methods presume
already a specific functional form that implicitly determines the shape of the demand func-
tion. A popular parametric specification is, for instance, the log–linear one, which implicitly
presumes a convex demand function. Given the lack of concrete empirical evidence, more
empirical work on the shape of demand functions would be helpful both for applying the
paper’s theoretical results and for testing its predictions empirically.
The formal exposition focused on a constant return to scale technology. This assumption
is not crucial. The results are, for example, readily extendable to any cost function under
the condition that the firm’s type enters multiplicatively. To make this more precise, define a
cost function c(x, θ) asmultiplicatively separable if there exist two functions g(.) and k(.) with
g′ ≥ 0 and k′ ≥ 0 such that c(x, θ) = g(θ)k(x). One may reformulate any multiplicatively
separable cost function in terms of θˆ and xˆ with θˆ = g(θ) and xˆ = k(x). Indeed, because
cˆ(xˆ, θˆ) = θˆxˆ = g(θ)k(x) = c(x, θ), the transformation yields a linear cost function in terms
of the transformed variables xˆ and θˆ. Defining vˆ(xˆ) ≡ v(k−1(xˆ)), it follows that the third
derivative of vˆ(.) now determines risk attitudes. Because vˆ(.) is a composite function of both
v(.) and k(.), attitudes depend both on consumer surplus and the firm’s cost function.
The present paper points to numerous extensions that would further enhance our un-
derstanding of regulatory risk. For instance, the current framework considered regulatory
14E.g., monopoly and oligopoly theory often assume concave demand functions in order to ensure that
the firm’s maximization problem is well defined and solutions are well behaved. In other studies, economic
theory often assumes that, at least locally, elasticities are constant. Constant elasticities imply convex
demand. Convex demand also obtains, if aggregate demand is derived from linear individual demand curves
with different intercepts; a typical exercise in standard text books.
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risk as unalterable and exogenous. An obvious critique is that this view of regulatory risk
is rather limited. Indeed, already the introduction motivated regulatory risk with changes
in political environments and tax systems. Clearly, such changes are not simply random
but depend on the behavior of economic agents. Hence, an obvious and important question
is how economic agent can and should manage regulatory risk. However, before one can
address such questions, a necessary first step is to understand the effect of regulatory risk
when it is exogenous. The contribution of the present paper is to provide this step.
Moreover, the paper models regulatory risk as uncertainty about the regulator’s objec-
tive function and, in particular, about two policy variables: the relative weight attached to
profits and the cost of public funds. Per definition, regulatory risk is any uncertainty about
future regulation and this uncertainty may have other causes than the ones examined here.
For instance, uncertainties about the regulator’s commitment to long term contracts (Laffont
and Tirole 1988) or his susceptibility to renegotiation (Laffont and Tirole 1990) may lead
to regulatory risk. In less developed countries, uncertainties about the rule of law and the
threat of expropriation may further exacerbate regulatory risk. Given the many different
origins of regulatory risk, a fruitful direction for future research is towards a comprehensive
classification of different causes and their consequences. From this perspective, the contri-
bution of this paper lies in providing a framework to analyze a specific class of regulatory
risk: uncertainty about the regulator’s policy variables.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Follows directly from the body text. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: It follows ∂2Π˜(c)/∂λ2 =
∫ ch
c ∂
2x∗(c˜)/∂λ2dc˜ and ∂2Π˜(c)/∂λ∂µ =∫ ch
c ∂
2x∗(c˜)/∂λ∂µdc˜ and ∂2Π˜(c)/∂µ2 =
∫ ch
c ∂
2x∗(c˜)/∂µ2dc˜. Therefore, Π˜(c) is convex in (λ, µ)
if x∗(c) is convex in (λ, µ) for all c ∈ (c, ch) and Π˜(c) is concave in (λ, µ) if x
∗(c) is concave
in (λ, µ) for all c ∈ (c, ch). From Proposition 1 it then follows that Π˜(c) is convex in (λ, µ)
whenever aggregate demand is convex (v′′′ > 0) and Π˜(c) is concave in (λ, µ) whenever
aggregate demand is concave (v′′′ < 0). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: It follows ∂2W˜/∂λ2 =
∫ ch
cl
∂2w˜(c˜)/∂λ2dc˜ and ∂2W˜/∂λ∂µ =∫ ch
cl
∂2w˜(c˜)/∂λ∂µdc˜ and ∂2W˜/∂µ2 =
∫ ch
cl
∂2w˜(c˜)/∂µ2dc˜. Therefore, W˜ is convex in (λ, µ) if
w˜ is convex in (λ, µ) for all c ∈ (cl, ch), which is the case because the Hessian Dw˜(λ, µ) is
positive semi–definite. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: It follows ∂2Ψ/∂λ2 =
∫ ch
cl
∂2ψ(x∗(c˜), c˜)/∂λ2dc˜ and ∂2Ψ/∂µ2 =∫ ch
cl
∂2ψ(x∗(c˜), c˜)/∂µ2dc˜. Therefore, Ψ is convex in λ if ψ(x∗(c˜), c˜) is convex in λ for all
c ∈ (cl, ch) and Ψ is concave in µ if ψ(x
∗(c˜), c˜) is concave in µ for all c ∈ (cl, ch). Expression
(19) shows that v′′′ > 0 is a sufficient condition for ψ(x∗(c˜), c˜) to be convex in λ. Expression
(20) shows that v′′′ < 0 is a sufficient condition for ψ(x∗(c˜), c˜) to be concave in µ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: According to Proposition 3 the regulator always likes regulatory
risk and, therefore, in particular with respect to λ and under condition (23). According to
Proposition 2, the condition v′′′(x) < 0 for all x ≤ x¯ and c ∈ [cl, ch] implies that Π(c) is
concave in λ for all c ∈ [cl, ch]. Hence, regardless of the firm’s cost–type, the firm dislikes
regulatory risk with respect to λ. Finally, condition (23) implies, due to λ ∈ [0, 1], that
|v′′′(x)|λh(c) ≤ |v′′′(x)|h(c) < [v′′(x)]2. According to (19), it therefore follows with v′′′(x) < 0
that ∂2ψ/∂λ2 < 0 for all x ∈ (0, x¯) and c ∈ [cl, ch] so that, by (17) and x
∗(λ, µ) ≤ x¯, we have
∂2Ψ/∂λ2 =
∫ ch
cl
∂2ψ/∂λ2dc < 0. This implies that the consumers dislike regulatory risk with
respect to λ. Hence, the risk preferences of the regulator contradict those of the firm and
consumers. Q.E.D.
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Formal Derivations (Not for Publication)
Derivation of (7):
W =
∫ ch
cl
W (x(c), t(c), c|λ, µ)dF (c) (24)
=
∫ ch
cl
v(x(c))− λcx(c)− (1 + µ− λ)t(c)dF (c) (25)
=
∫ ch
cl
{
v(x(c))− λcx(c)− (1 + µ− λ)(Π˜(c) + cx(c))
}
f(c)dc (26)
=
∫ ch
cl
{
v(x(c))− (1 + µ)cx(c)− (1 + µ− λ)Π˜(c)
}
f(c)dc (27)
=
∫ ch
cl
{v(x(c))− (1 + µ)cx(c))} f(c)dc (28)
−(1 + µ− λ)
∫ ch
cl
Π˜(c)f(c)dc (29)
=
∫ ch
cl
{v(x(c))− (1 + µ)cx(c))} f(c)dc (30)
−(1 + µ− λ)
[
[F (c)Π(c)]c=chc=cl −
∫ ch
cl
Π˜′(c)F (c)dc
]
(31)
=
∫ ch
cl
{v(x(c))− (1 + µ)cx(c))} f(c)dc (32)
+(1 + µ− λ)
[∫ ch
cl
x(c)F (c)dc
]
(33)
=
∫ ch
cl
{v(x(c))− (1 + µ)cx(c))− (1 + µ− λ)x(c)h(c)} f(c)dc. (34)
Derivation of (12):
t(c) = Π˜(c) + cx(c) (35)
= −
∫ ch
cl
Π˜′(c) + x(c) + cx′(c)dc+ t(ch) (36)
= −
∫ ch
cl
cx′(c)dc+ t(ch) (37)
= −
∫ ch
c
c
∂x∗(λ, µ|c)
∂c
dc− chx
∗(λ, µ|ch). (38)
Derivation of (14): Differentiation of the left identity in (13) with respect to λ yields
v′′′(x∗(c))
(
∂x∗
∂λ
)2
+ v′′(x∗(c))
∂2x∗
∂λ2
= 0 (39)
⇔
∂2x∗
∂λ2
= −
v′′′(x∗(c))
v′′(x∗(c))
(
∂x∗
∂λ
)2
(40)
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Derivation of (15): Differentiation of the right identity in (13) with respect to µ yields
v′′′(x∗(c))
(
∂x∗
∂µ
)2
+ v′′(x∗(c))
∂2x∗
∂µ2
= 0 (41)
⇔
∂2x∗
∂µ2
= −
v′′′(x∗(c))
v′′(x∗(c))
(
∂x∗
∂µ
)2
(42)
Derivation of (16): Differentiation of the left identity in (13) with respect to µ yields
v′′′(x∗(c))
∂x∗
∂µ
∂x∗
∂µ
+ v′′(x∗(c))
∂2x∗
∂λ∂µ
= 0 (43)
⇔
∂2x∗
∂λ∂µ
= −
v′′′(x∗(c))
v′′(x∗(c))
∂x∗
∂µ
∂x∗
∂µ
. (44)
Derivation of (17):
Ψ =
∫ ch
cl
Ψ(t∗(c), x∗(c))f(c)dc (45)
=
∫ ch
cl
(v(x∗(c))− (1 + µ)t∗(c))f(c)dc (46)
=
∫ ch
cl
(v(x∗(c))− (1 + µ)[Π˜(c) + cx∗(c)])f(c)dc (47)
=
∫ ch
cl
(v(x∗(c))− (1 + µ)[x∗(c)h(c) + cx∗(c)])f(c)dc (48)
=
∫ ch
cl
[v(x∗(c))− (1 + µ)(c+ h(c))x∗(c)]f(c)dc (49)
=
∫ ch
cl
ψ(x∗(c), c|λ, µ)f(c)dc, (50)
where the fourth equality uses an integration by parts as in (30).
Derivation of (19): Differentiating (18) with respect to λ yields
∂ψ
∂λ
= [v′(x∗(c))− (1 + µ)(c+ h(c))]
∂x∗(c)
∂λ
. (51)
A further differentiation of (51) with respect to λ and using (10) and (14) yields
∂2ψ
∂λ2
= v′′(x∗)
(
∂x∗
∂λ
)2
+ (v′(x∗)−(1 + µ)(c+ h(c)))
∂2x∗
∂λ2
(52)
= v′′(x∗)
(
∂x∗
∂λ
)2
− λh(c)
∂2x∗
∂λ2
(53)
=
[
v′′′(x∗)
v′′(x∗)
λh(c) + v′′(x∗)
](
∂x∗
∂λ
)2
. (54)
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Derivation of (20): Differentiating (18) with respect to µ yields
∂ψ
∂µ
= [v′(x∗)− (1 + µ)(c+ h(c))]
∂x∗
∂µ
− (c+ h(c))x∗. (55)
A further differentiation of (55) with respect to µ and using the right hand equation in
(13) and (10) and, finally, (15) yields
∂2ψ
∂µ2
= v′′(x∗)
(
∂x∗
∂µ
)2
− 2(c+ h(c))
∂x∗
∂µ
(56)
+(v′(x∗)− (1 + µ)(c+ h(c))
∂2x∗
∂µ2
(57)
= v′′(x∗)
(
∂x∗
∂µ
)2
− 2v′′(x∗)
(
∂x∗
∂µ
)2
− λh(c)
∂2x∗
∂µ2
(58)
= −v′′(x∗)
(
∂x∗
∂µ
)2
− λh(c)
∂2x∗
∂µ2
(59)
=
[
v′′′(x∗)
v′′(x∗)
λh(c)− v′′(x∗)
](
∂x∗
∂µ
)2
. (60)
Derivation of (21): Further differentiation of (51) with respect to µ and using (10) and
the right hand equation in (13) and, finally, (16) yields
∂2ψ
∂λ∂µ
= v′′(x∗)
∂x∗
∂λ
∂x∗
∂µ
+ [v′(x∗)− (1 + µ)(c+ h(c))]
∂2x∗
∂λ∂µ
(61)
−(c+ h(c))
∂x∗
∂λ
(62)
= v′′(x∗)
∂x∗
∂λ
∂x∗
∂µ
− λh(c)
∂2x∗
∂λ∂µ
− v′′(x∗)
∂x∗
∂µ
∂x∗
∂λ
(63)
= λh(c)
v′′′(x∗)
v′′(x∗)
∂x∗
∂λ
∂x∗
∂µ
(64)
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